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1 Introduction
The state-of-the-art in complexity theory forces cryptographers to base their schemes on unproven hardness
assumptions. Such assumptions can be general (e.g., the existence of one-way functions) or specific (e.g.,
the hardness of RSA or the Discrete logarithm problem). Specific hardness assumptions are usually stronger
than their general counterparts; however, as such assumptions consider primitives with more structure, they
lend themselves to constructions of more efficient protocols, and sometimes even to the constructions of
objects that are not known to exist when this extra structure is not present. Indeed, in recent years, several
new and more exotic specific hardness assumptions have been introduced (e.g., [11, 4, 10]) leading to, among
other things, signatures schemes with improved efficiency, but also the first provably secure construction of
identity-based encryption.
In this paper, we introduce a new class of strong but general hardness assumptions, and show how these
assumptions can be used to resolve certain long-standing open problems in cryptography. Our assumptions
are all abstractions of concrete properties of a random oracle. As such, our results show that for the prob-
lems we consider, random oracles are not necessary; rather, provably secure constructions can be based on
concrete hardness assumptions.
1.1 New-Age Assumptions
We consider adaptive strengthenings of standard general hardness assumptions, such as the existence of
one-way functions and pseudorandom generators. More specifically, we introduce the notion of collections
of adaptive 1-1 one-way functions and collections of adaptive pseudorandom generators. Intuitively,
• A collection of adaptively 1-1 one-way functions is a family of 1-1 functions Fn = {ftag : {0, 1}n 7→
{0, 1}n} such that for every tag, it is hard to invert ftag(r) for a random r, even for an adversary that
is granted access to an “inversion oracle” for ftag′ for every tag 6= tag′. In other words, the function
ftag is one-way, even with access to an oracle that invert all the other functions in the family.
• A collection of adaptive pseudo-random generators is a family of functions Gn = Gtag : {0, 1}n 7→
{0, 1}m such that for every tag, Gtag is a pseudorandom even if given access to an oracle that decides
whether given y is in the range of G.
Both the above assumptions are strong, but arguably not “unrealistically” strong. Indeed, both these as-
sumptions are satisfied by a (sufficiently) length-extending random oracle.1 As such, they provide concrete
mathematical assumptions that can be used to instantiate random oracles in certain applications.
We also present some concrete candidate instantiations of these assumptions. For the case of adaptive
1-1 one-way functions, we provide construction based on the the “adaptive security” of Factoring, or the
Discrete Log problem.
For the case of adaptive PRGs, we provide a candidate construction based on a generalization of the
advanced encryption standard (AES).
Related Assumptions in the Literature. Assumptions of a related flavor have appeared in a number of
works. The class of “one-more” assumptions introduced by Bellare, Namprempre, Pointcheval and Se-
manko [4] are similar in flavor. Informally, the setting of the one-more RSA-inversion problem is the
following: The adversary is given values z1, z2, . . . , zk ∈ Z∗N (for a composite N = pq, a product of two
1Note that a random function over, say, {0, 1}n → {0, 1}4n is 1-1 except with exponentially small probability.
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primes) and is given access to an oracle that computes RSA inverses. The adversary wins if the number of
values that it computes an RSA inverse of, exceeds the number of calls it makes to the oracle. They prove
the security of Chaum’s blind-signature scheme under this assumption. This flavor of assumptions has been
used in numerous other subsequent works [5, 6].
Prabhakaran and Sahai [28] use an assumption of the form that there are collision-resistant hash func-
tions that are secure even if the adversary has access to a “collision-sampler”. In a related work, Malkin,
Moriarty and Yakovenko [21] assume that the discrete logarithm problem in Z∗p (where p is a k-bit prime)
is hard even for an adversary that has access to an oracle that computes discrete logarithms in Z∗q for any
k-bit prime q 6= p. Both these works use the assumption to achieve secure computation in a relaxation of
the universal composability framework.
1.2 New-Age Results
Non-Interactive Concurrently Non-Malleable Commitment Schemes. Non-malleable commitment schemes
were first defined and constructed in the seminal paper of Dolev, Dwork and Naor [16]. Informally, a com-
mitment scheme is non-malleable if no adversary can, upon seeing a commitment to a value v, produce a
commitment to a related value (say v − 1). Indeed, non-malleability is crucial to applications which rely on
the independence of the committed values. A much stronger property – called concurrent non-malleability –
requires that no adversary, after receiving commitments of v1, . . . , vm, can produce commitments to related
values v˜1, . . . , v˜m.
The first non-malleable commitment scheme of [16] was interactive, and required O(log n) rounds of
interaction, where n is a security parameter. Barak [1] and subsequently, Pass and Rosen [26] presented
constant-round non-malleable commitment schemes. The only known construction of a concurrent non-
malleable commitment scheme is due to Pass and Rosen [25], and requires 12 rounds of interaction between
the committer and the receiver.
We note that of the above commitment schemes, [16] is the only one with a black-box proof of security,
whereas the schemes of [1, 26, 25] rely on the novel non-black-box proof technique introduced by [1]. In
particular, there is no known concurrently non-malleable commitment schemes with a black-box proof of
security.
Our first result is a construction of a non-interactive, concurrently non-malleable string commitment
scheme, from a family of adaptive one-way permutations. Additionally, our construction is the first concur-
rently non-malleable commitment scheme with a black-box proof of security.
Theorem 1 (Informal) Assume the existence of collections of adaptive 1-1 permutations. Then, there exists
a non-interactive concurrently non-malleable string commitment scheme with a black-box proof of security.
If instead assuming the existence of adaptive PRGs, we show the existence of 2-round concurrent non-
malleable commitment with a black-box proof of security.
Theorem 2 (Informal) Assume the existence of collections of adaptive PRGS. Then, there exists a 2-round
concurrently non-malleable string commitment scheme with a black-box proof of security.
Round-optimal Black-box Non-malleable Zero-knowledge. Dolev, Dwork and Naor [16] defined non-
malleable zero-knowledge (ZK) and presented an O(log n)-round ZK proof system. Barak [1] and subse-
quently, Pass and Rosen [26] presented constant-round non-malleable zero-knowledge argument system. Of
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the above protocols, [16] is the only one with a black-box proof of security, whereas the schemes of [1, 26]
rely on the non-black-box proof technique of [1].
We construct a 4-round non-malleable zero-knowledge argument system with a black-box proof of secu-
rity (that is, a black-box simulator). Four rounds is known to be optimal for black-box zero-knowledge [18]
(even if the protocol is not required to be non-malleable) and for non-malleable protocols (even if they are
not required to be zero-knowledge) [20].
Theorem 3 (Informal) Assume the existence of collections of adaptive 1-1 one-way function. Then, there
exists a 4-round non-malleable zero-knowledge argument system with a black-box proof of security. Assume,
instead, the existence of collections of adaptive one-way permutations. Then, there exists a 5-round non-
malleable zero-knowledge argument system with a black-box proof of security.
It is interesting to note that the (seemingly) related notion of concurrent zero-knowledge cannot be
achieved in o(log n) rounds with a black-box proof of security. Thus, our result shows that (under our
new-age assumptions), the notion of non-malleability and concurrency in the context of zero-knowledge are
quantitatively different.
Efficient Chosen-Ciphertext Secure Encryption. Chosen ciphertext (CCA) security was introduced in
the works of [23, 29] and has since been recognized as a sine-qua-non for secure encryption. Dolev, Dwork
and Naor [16] gave the first construction of CCA-secure encryption schemes based on general assumptions.
Their construction, as well as the construction of Sahai [30], uses the machinery of non-interactive zero-
knowledge proofs, which renders them less efficient than one would like. In contrast, the construction of
Cramer and Shoup [14, 15] are efficent, but are based on specific number-theoretic assumptions.
Bellare and Rogaway [7] proposed an encryption scheme that is CCA-secure in the random oracle model
(see below for more details about the random oracle model). We show complexity-theoretic assumptions that
are sufficient to replace the random oracle in this construction. We mention that, previously, Canetti [12]
showed how to replace random oracles in a related construction to get a semantically secure encryption
scheme (but without CCA security). Our construction of CCA-secure encryption is in Appendix D.
Interactive Arguments for which Parallel-repetition does not reduce the soundness error. A basic
question regarding interactive proof is whether parallel repetition of such protocols reduces the soundness
error. Bellare, Impagliazzo and Naor [3] show that there are interactive arguments (i.e., computationally-
sound) proofs in the Common Reference String (CRS) model, for which parallel-repetition does not reduce
the soundness error. Their construction relies on non-malleable encryption, and makes use of the CRS to
select the public-key for this encryption scheme. However, if instead relying on a non-interactive concurrent
non-malleable commitment schemes in their construction, we can dispense of the CRS altogether. Thus, by
Theorem 1, assuming the existence of collections of adaptive 1-1 one-way functions, we show that there
exists an interactive argument for which parallel repetition does not reduce the soundness error. We also
mention that the same technique can be applied also to the strengthened construction of [27].
Our Techniques. All our constructions are simple and efficient. In particular, for the case of non-malleable
commitment schemes, we show that appropriate instantiations of the Blum-Micali [9] or Naor [22] commit-
ment schemes in fact are non-malleable. The proof of these schemes are also “relatively straight-forward”
and follow nicely from the adaptive property of the underlying primitives.
Next, we show that by appropriately using our non-malleable commitment protocols in the Feige-Shamir
[17] zero-knowledge argument forNP , we can also get a round-optimal black-box non-malleableZK proof
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forNP . Although the construction here is straight-forward, its proof of correctness is less so. In particular,
to show that our protocol is non-malleable, we rely on a techniques that are quite different from traditional
proofs of non-malleability: in particular, the power of the “adaptive” oracle will only be used inside hybrid
experiments; the simulation, on the other hand, will proceed by traditional rewinding. Interestingly, to get
a round-optimal solution, our proof inherently relies on the actual Feige-Shamir protocol and high-lights
some novel features of this protocol.
Interpreting Our Results. We offer two interpretations of our results:
• The optimistic interpretation: Although our assumptions are strong, they nonetheless do not (a priori)
seem infeasible. Thus, if we believe that e.g., AES behaves as an adaptively secure PRG, we show
practical solutions to important open questions.
• The conservative interpretation: As mentioned, our constructions are black-box; namely, both the
construction of the cryptographic objects and the associated security proof utilize the underlying
primitive—adaptive one-way permutations or adaptive PRGs—as a black-box, and in particular, do
not refer to a specific implementation of these primitives. Thus, a conservative way to view our results
is that to show even black-box lower-bounds and impossibility results for non-interactive concurrent
non-malleable commitments and non-malleable zero-knowledge proofs, one first needs to to refute our
assumptions. Analogously, it means that breaking our CCA-secure encryptions scheme, or proving a
general parallel-repetition theorem for interactive arguments, first requires refuting our assumptions.
1.3 New-Age Perspective
A cryptographer could choose to make “mild” assumptions such as P 6= NP , “relatively mild” ones such as
the existence of one-way functions, secure encryption schemes or trapdoor permutations, or “preposterous”
ones such as “this scheme is secure”. Whereas preposterous assumptions clearly are undesirable, mild
assumptions are—given the state-of-the-art in complexity theory—too weak for cryptographic constructions
of non-trivial tasks. Relatively mild assumptions, on the other hand, are sufficient for showing the feasibility
of essentially all known cryptographic primitives.
Yet, to obtain practical constructions, such assumptions are—given the current-state-of-art—not suffi-
cient. In fact, it is a priori not even clear that although feasibility of a cryptographic task can be based
on a relatively mild assumptions, that a “practical” construction of the primitive is possible (at all!). One
approach to overcome this gap is the random oracle paradigm, introduced in the current form by Bellare
and Rogaway [7]: the proposed paradigm is to prove the security of a cryptographic scheme in the random-
oracle model—where all parties have access to a truly random function—and next instantiate the random
oracle with a concrete function “with appropriate properties”. Nevertheless, as pointed out in [13] (see also
[19, 2]) there are (pathological) schemes that can be proven secure in the random oracle model, but are
rendered insecure when the random oracle is replaced by any concrete function (or family of functions).
In this work we, instead, investigate a different avenue for overcoming this gap between theory and
practice, by introducing strong, but general, hardness assumption. When doing so, we, of course, need to be
careful to make sure that our assumptions (although potentially “funky”) are not preposterous. One criterion
in determining the acceptability of a cryptographic assumption A is to consider (1) what the assumption is
used for (for instance, to construct a primitive P , say) and (2) how much more “complex” the primitive P
is, compared to A. For example, a construction of a pseudorandom generator assuming a one-way func-
tion is non-trivial, whereas the reverse direction is not nearly as interesting. Unfortunately, the notion of
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“complexity” of an assumption is hard to define. We here offer a simple interpretation: view complexity
as “succinctness”. General assumption are usually more succinct than specific assumptions, one-way func-
tions are “easier” to define than, say, pseudorandom functions. Given this point of view, it seems that our
assumptions are not significantly more complex than traditional hardness assumption; yet they allow us to
construct considerably more complex objects (e.g., non-malleable zero-knowledge proofs).
On Falsifiability/Refutability of Our Assumptions Note that the notions of non-malleable commitment
and non-malleable zero-knowledge both are defined using simulation-based definitions. As such, simply
assuming that a practical scheme is, say, non-malleable zero-knowledge, seems like a very strong assump-
tion, which is hard to falsify2—in fact, to falsify it one needs to show (using a mathematical proof) that no
Turning machine is a good simulator. In contrast, to falsify our assumptions it is sufficient to exhibit an
attacker (just as with the traditional cryptographic hardness assumptions).
To make such “qualitative” differences more precise, Naor [24] introduced a framework for classifying
assumptions, based on how “practically” an assumption can refuted. Whereas non-malleability, a priori,
seems impossible to falsify (as there a-priori is not a simple way to showing that no simulator exists). In
contrast, traditional assumptions such as “factoring is hard” can be easily refuted simply by publishing
challenges that a “falsifier” is required to solve. Our assumptions cannot be as easily refuted, as even if
a falsifier exhibits an attack against a candidate adaptive OWF, it is unclear how to check that this attack
works. However, the same can be said also for relatively mild (and commonly used) assumptions, such as
“factoring is hard for subexponential-time”.3
Additionally, we would like to argue that our assumptions enjoy a similar “win/win” situation as tra-
ditional cryptographic hardness assumptions. The adaptive security of the factoring or discrete logarithm
problems seem like natural computational number theoretic questions. A refutation of our assumptions (and
its implication to factoring and discrete logarithm problem) would thus be interesting in its own right. Taken
to its extreme, this approach suggest that we might even consider assumptions that most probably are false,
such as e.g., assuming that AES is an (adaptive one-way) permutation, as long as we believe that it might be
hard to prove that the assumption is false.
2 New Assumptions and Definitions
The following sections introduce our definitions of adaptively secure objects—one-way functions, pseudo-
random generators and commitment schemes—and posit candidate constructions for adaptively secure one-
way functions and pseudorandom generators. Standard cryptographic definitions (non-malleable commit-
ments and zero-knowledge) are delegated to Appendix A.
2.1 Adaptive One-Way Functions
In this paper, we define a family of adaptively secure injective one-way functions, where each function in
the family is specified by an index tag. The adaptive security requirement says the following: consider an
adversary that picks an index tag∗ and is given y∗ = ftag∗(x∗) for a random x∗ in the domain of ftag∗ ,
2Recall that falsifiability is Popper’s classical criterion for distinguishing scientific and “pseudo-scientific” statements.
3Note that the assumption that factoring is hard for subexponential-time can be falsified by considering a publishing a very
“short” challenge (or length polylogn). However, in the same vein, our assumption can be falsified by considering challenges of
length logn; then it is easy to check if someone can exhibit an efficient attack on the adaptive security of an assumed one-way
function, since the inverting oracle can also be efficiently implemented.
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and the adversary is supposed to compute x∗. The adversary, in addition, has access to a “magic oracle”
that on input (tag, y) where tag 6= tag∗, and get back f−1tag(y). In other words, the magic oracle helps
invert all functions ftag different from the “target function” ftag∗ . The security requirement is that the
adversary have at most a negligible chance of computing x∗, even with this added ability. Note that the
magic oracle is just a fictitious entity, which possibly does not have an efficient implementation (as opposed
to the decryption oracle in the definition of CCA-security for encryption schemes which can be implemented
efficiently given the secret-key). Inability to invert y∗ even with access to such an oracle is indeed a strong
security requirement on the function f ! More formally,
Definition 1 (Family of Adaptive One-to-one One-way Functions) A family of injective one-way func-
tions F = {ftag : Dtag 7→ {0, 1}∗}tag∈{0,1}n is called adaptively secure if,
• (EASY TO SAMPLE AND COMPUTE.) There is an efficient randomized domain-sampler D, which on
input tag ∈ I¯ , outputs a random element in Dtag. There is a deterministic polynomial algorithm M
such that for all tag← I and for all x ∈ Dtag, M(tag, x) = ftag(x).
• (ADAPTIVE ONE-WAYNESS.) Let O(tag, ·, ·) denote an oracle that, on input tag′ and y outputs
f−1tag′(y) if tag′ 6= tag and ⊥ otherwise.4
The family F is adaptively secure if, for any probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A, there exists
a negligible function µ such that for all sufficiently large k, and for all tags tag ∈ I¯k,
Pr[x← D(tag, 1k) : AO(tag,·,·)(tag, ftag(x)) = x] ≤ µ(n)
where the probability is over the random choice tag output by I , the random choice of x and the
coin-tosses of A.
A potentially incomparable assumption is that of an adaptively secure injective one-way function (as
opposed to a family of functions). However, it is easy to see that an adaptively secure one-way function
with subexponential security and a dense domain implies a family of adaptively secure one-way functions,
as defined above. In fact, our construction of a family of adaptively secure one-way functions based on
factoring goes through this construction.
Hardness Amplification. A strong adaptively secure one-way function is one where no adversary can in-
vert the function with probability better than some negligible function in k (even with access to the inversion
oracle). A weak one, on the other hand, only requires that the adversary not be able to invert the function
with a probability better than 1− 1/poly(k) (even with access to the inversion oracle).
We remark that we can construct a strong adaptively secure one-way function from a weak adaptively
secure one-way function. The construction is the same as Yao’s hardness amplification lemma. We defer
the details to the full version.
2.1.1 Candidates
We present candidates for adaptively secure one-way functions, based on assumptions related to discrete-log
and factoring.
4If tag′ is not a valid tag, namely, if tag′ is not in the range of I(1k), then again O outputs ⊥.
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Factoring. First, we show how to build an adaptively secure one-way function (not a family of functions)
from the factoring assumption. Then, we show how to turn it into a family of functions, assuming, in
addition, that factoring is subexponentially-hard.
The domain of the function f is {(p, q) | p, q ∈ Pn, p < q}, where Pn is the set of all n-bit primes.
Given this notation, f(p, q) is defined to be pq. Assuming that it is hard to factor a number N that is a
product of primes, even with access to an oracle that factors all other products of two primes, this function
is adaptively secure.
We now show how to turn this into a family of adaptively secure one-way functions. The index is simply
an n′ = n1/-bit string (for some  > 0) i = (i1, i2). The domain is the set of all strings (j1, j2) such that
p = i1 ◦ j1 and q = i2 ◦ j2 are both n-bit primes. The function then outputs pq. Since we reveal the first
n′ = n1/ bits of the factors of N = pq, we need to assume that factoring is subexponentially hard (even
with access to an oracle that factors other products of two primes). The function is clearly injective since
factoring forms an injective function.
In the full version, we additionally provide candidates for adaptive one-way functions based on the RSA
and Rabin functions.
Discrete Logarithms. The family of adaptive OWFs FDL is defined as follows: The index set I¯n =
{0, 1}n. The domain of the function is a tuple (p, g, x) such that p is a 2n-bit prime p whose first n bits
equal the index i, g is a generator for Z∗p and x is a 2n − 1-bit number. The domain is easy to sample–the
sampler picks a “long-enough” random string r and a 2n−1-bit number x. The function fi uses r to sample
a 2n-bit prime p whose first n bits equal i (this can be done by repeated sampling, and runs in polynomial
time assuming a uniformness conjecture on the density of primes in large intervals) and a generator g ∈ Z∗p.
The output of the function on input (p, g, x) is (p, g, gx mod p). fi is injective since the output determines p
and g; given p and g, gx mod p next determines x uniquely since x < 22n−1 and p, being a 2n-bit prime, is
larger than 22n−1.
We also mention that the adaptive security of this family can be based on the subexponential adaptive
security of the one-way function (as opposed to family) obtained by simply sampling random p, g, x (or
even random p being a safe prime) and outputting p, g, gx. Note that this assumption is different from the
assumption of [21] in that we require security to hold only w.r.t to a random prime p whereas [21] requires it
to holds also w.r.t to adversarially chosen p; in contrast we require security w.r.t sub-exponential adversaries.
2.2 Adaptive Pseudorandom Generator
A family of adaptively secure pseudorandom generators G = {Gtag}tag∈{0,1}∗ is defined in a similar way to
an adaptive one-way function. We require that the output of the generator G, on a random input x and an
adversarially chosen tag be indistinguishable from uniform, even for an adversary that can query a magic
oracle with a value (tag′, y) (where tag′ 6= tag) and get back 0 or 1 depending on whether y is in the range
of Gtag′ or not.
Definition 2 (Adaptive PRG) A family of functions G = {Gtag : {0, 1}n 7→ {0, 1}s(n)}tag∈{0,1}n is an
adaptively secure pseudorandom generator (PRG) if |Gtag(x)| = s(|x|) for some function s such that
s(n) ≥ n for all n and,
• (EFFICIENT COMPUTABILITY.) There is a deterministic polynomial-time algorithm MG such that
MG(x, tag) = Gtag(x).
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• (ADAPTIVE PSEUDORANDOMNESS.) Let O(tag, ·, ·) denote an oracle that, on input (tag′, y) such
that tag′ 6= tag, outputs 1 if y is in the range of Gtag′ and 0 otherwise.
The PRG G is adaptively secure if, for any probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A, there exists a
negligible function µ such that for all sufficiently large n and for all tags tag ∈ {0, 1}n,∣∣Pr[y ← Gtag(Un) : AO(tag,·,·)(y) = 1]− Pr[y ← Um : AO(tag,·,·)(y) = 1]∣∣ ≤ µ(n)
where the probability is over the random choice of y and the coin-tosses of A.
2.2.1 Candidates
For the case of adaptive PRGs, we provide a candidate construction based on the advanced encryption
standard (AES). AES is a permutation on 128 bits; that is, for a 128-bit seed s, AESs is a permutation defined
on {0, 1}128. However, due to the algebraic nature of the construction of AES, it can easily be generalized
to longer input length. Let AESn denote this generalized version of AES to n-bit inputs. Our candidate
adaptive pseudorandom generator AESGtag is simply AESGtag(s) = AESs(tag ◦ 0) ◦ AESs(tag ◦ 1).
2.3 Adaptively Secure Commitment Schemes
In this subsection, we define adaptively secure commitment schemes. Let {COMtag = 〈Stag, Rtag〉}tag∈{0,1}∗
denote a family of commitment protocols, indexed by a string tag. We require that the commitment scheme
be secure, even against an adversary that can query a magic oracle on the transcript of a commitment interac-
tion and get back a message that was committed to in the transcript. More precisely, the adversary picks an
index tag and two equal-length strings x0 and x1 and gets a value yb = COMtag(xb; r), where b is a random
bit and r is random. The adversary can, in addition, query a magic oracle on (y′, tag′) where tag′ 6= tag
and get back the some x′ such that y′ ∈ COMtag′(x′; r′) (if y′ is a legal commitment) and ⊥ otherwise. 5
The security requirement is that the adversary cannot distinguish whether yb was a commitment to x0 or x1,
even with this extra power.
Definition 3 (Adaptively-Secure Commitment) A family of functions {COMtag}tag∈{0,1}∗ is called an adap-
tively secure commitment scheme if Stag and Rtag are polynomial-time and
• STATISTICAL BINDING: For any tag, over the coin-tosses of the receiver R, the probability that a
transcript 〈S∗, Rtag〉 has two valid openings is negligible.
• ADAPTIVE SECURITY: Let O(tag, ·, ·) denote the oracle that, on input tag′ 6= tag and c, returns
an x ∈ {0, 1}` such that for some random strings rS and rR, c is the transcript of the interaction
between S with input x and random coins rS and R with random coins rR.
For any probabilistic polynomial-time oracle TM A, there exists a negligible function µ(·) such that
for all sufficiently large n, for all tag ∈ {0, 1}∗ and for all x, y ∈ {0, 1}`,∣∣Pr[c← 〈Stag(x), Rtag〉;AO(tag,·,·)(c, tag) = 1]−Pr[c← 〈Stag(y), Rtag〉;AO(tag,·)(c, tag) = 1]∣∣ ≤ µ(n)
5In case the transcript corresponds to the commitment of multiple messages, the oracle returns a canonical one of them. In fact,
one of our commitment schemes is perfectly binding and thus, does not encounter this problem.
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3 Non-Malleable Commitment Schemes
In this section, we construct non-malleable string-commitment schemes. We first construct adaptively-
secure bit-commitment schemes based on an adaptively secure injective OWF and an adaptively secure PRG
– the first of these constructions is non-interactive and the second is a 2-round commitment scheme. We
then show a simple “concatenation lemma”, that constructs an adaptively secure string commitment scheme
from an adaptively-secure bit-commitment scheme. Finally, we show that an adaptively secure commitment
scheme is also non-malleable. For full proofs, see Appendix B.
Lemma 4 Assume that there exists a family of adaptively secure injective one-way functions. Then, there ex-
ists an adaptively secure bit-commitment scheme. Furthermore, the commitment scheme is non-interactive.
Further, assuming the existence of a family of adaptively secure pseudorandom generators, there exists
a 2-round adaptively secure bit-commitment scheme.
The first of these constructions follows by replacing the injective one-way function in the Blum-Micali [9]
commitment scheme, with an adaptively secure one, and the second follows from the Naor commitment
scheme [22] in an analogous way.
Lemma 5 (Concatenation Lemma) If there is an adaptively secure family of bit-commitment schemes,
then there is an adaptively secure family of string-commitment schemes.
The concatenation lemma follows by simply committing to each bit of the message independently using
a single-bit commitment scheme COMtag.
Lemma 6 Let {COMtag}tag∈{0,1}n be a tag-based adaptively secure commitment scheme Then, there is a
non-malleable commitment scheme COM′.
This is a standard proof using signature schemes to compile an adaptively secure commitment scheme
to a plain non-malleable commitment scheme. Putting together, these lemmas prove theorems 1 and 2.
4 Four-Round Non-Malleable Zero-Knowledge
In this section, we present a 4-round non-malleable zero-knowledge argument system. The argument system
is exactly the Feige-Shamir protocol [17], compiled with an adaptively secure commitment scheme. In our
analysis we rely on the following properties of the Feige-Shamir protocol:
• The first property is that the first prover message is (perfectly) independent of the witness used by
the prover (and even the statement!). This property has previously been used to simplify analysis, but
here we inherently rely on this property to enable our analysis.
• The second property is that given a random accepting transcript, and the openings of the commit-
ments in the first message, it is possible to “extract a witness”. In other words, any transcript implic-
itly defines a witness; additionally, given a random transcript, this witness will be valid with a high
probability (if the transcript is accepting).
In what follows, we present a sketch of the protocol and the proof and refer the reader to Appendix C
for the full text of the protocol description and the proof.
4.1 An Adaptively Secure Witness Indistinguishable Proof of Knowledge
The main component in the NMZK protocol is a three-round witness-indistinguishable proof of knowledge
(WIPOK) Π. The protocol is simply a parallelization of the 3-round zero-knowledge proof Π˜ for the NP-
complete language of Hamiltonicity [8, 17], with the only change that the commitment scheme used in the
proof is adaptively secure.
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In fact, we construct a family of protocols Πtag, indexed by tag. The protocol Πtag – which is a parallel
repetition of Π˜tag – has an adaptive WI property which, roughly stated, means that the transcripts of the
protocol when the prover uses two different witnessesw1 andw2 are computationally indistinguishable, even
if the distinguisher has access to a magic oracle that inverts all commitments COMtag′ , where tag′ 6= tag.
Lemma 7 Let τw denote a random transcript of the protocol Πtag between the prover P and the verifier V
on common input x and where the prover has auxiliary input w and the verifier has auxiliary input z. Then,
for every x, z and w,w′ such that RL(w) = RL(w′) = 1, and for every PPT machine D with oracle access
to O(tag, ·, ·), the following quantity is negligible in k:∣∣Pr[DO(tag,·,·)(x, z, w,w′, τw) = 1]− Pr[DO(tag,·,·)(x, z, w,w′, τw′) = 1]∣∣
The messages in the three rounds of the protocol Π˜tag will be denoted A,C and Z respectively. It turns
out that with probability 12 over the choice of randomness in the protocol, a transcript of Π˜tag uniquely
defines a witness (even though not it is not computable in polynomial-time). We define this to be the witness
implicit in the transcript in an instance of Πtag. Furthermore, we show that the implicit witness in Πtag is
computable given access to O(tag′, ·, ·) for any tag′ 6= tag. For more precise definitions, see Appendix C.
Lemma 8 Given oracle access to the commitment-inversion oracle O(tag′, ·, ·) for an tag′ 6= tag, the
witness implicit in any accepting transcript of Π˜tag can be computed in polynomial time.
4.2 The Non-Malleable Zero-Knowledge Argument System
The non-malleable ZK protocol consists of two instances of the protocol Πtag running in conjunction, one of
them initiated by the verifier and the other initiated by the prover. We will denote the copy of Πtag initiated
by the verifier as ΠVtag and the one initiated by the prover as ΠPtag. We will use the notation from the previous
subsection to describe the messages in these protocols – the messages in the protocol ΠVtag (resp. ΠPtag)
appear with a superscript of V (resp. P ).
Theorem 9 Assume that COM is a non-interactive adaptively secure commitment scheme. Then, the proto-
col in Figure 1 is a 4-round non-malleable zero-knowledge argument system.
Proof: Completeness, soundness and zero-knowledge properties of the protocol follow directly from the
corresponding properties of the Feige-Shamir protocol. In Lemma 10, we show that the protocol non-
malleable.
In other words, for every man-in-the-middle adversary A that interacts with the prover Ptag on a state-
ment x and convinces the verifier Vtag′ (for a tag′ 6= tag) in a right-interaction on a statement x′ (possibly
the same as x), we construct a stand-alone prover that convinces the verifier on x′ with the same probability
as A, but without access to the left-interaction. The construction of the stand-alone prover in the proof of
non-malleability (see Lemma 10) relies on the adaptive security of the commitment scheme COMtag. It is
important to note that the stand-alone prover itself runs in classical polynomial-time, and in particular does
not use any oracles. Access to the commitment-inversion oracle is used only to show that the stand-alone
prover works as expected (and in particular, that it convinces the verifier with the same probability as does
the MIM adversary). 
Lemma 10 The protocol NMtag in Figure 1 is non-malleable.
Proof: For every man-in-the-middle adversary A, we construct a stand-alone prover S that convinces the
verifier with essentially the same probability that A does. Very roughly, the construction of the stand-alone
prover S proceeds in two steps.
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Non-Malleable Zero-Knowledge Argument NMtag
COMMON INPUT: An instance x ∈ {0, 1}n, presumably in the language L.
PROVER INPUT: A witness w such that (x,w) ∈ RL.
ROUND 1: (Verifier) Pick w1 and w2 at random and compute xi = f(wi) for i ∈ {1, 2}.
Let the NP-relation RV = {((x1, x2), w′) | either f(w′) = x1 or f(w′) = x2}.
Initiate the WI protocol ΠVtag with the statement (x1, x2) ∈ LV . In particular,
V→ P : Send (x1, x2) to P . Send AV1 , AV2 , . . . , AVn to P .
ROUND 2: (Prover) Let the NP-relation RP be
{((x, x1, x2), w) | either (x,w) ∈ RL or f(w) = x1 or f(w) = x2}
Initiate a WI protocol ΠPtag with common input (x, x1, x2). Also, send the second-round messages
of the protocol ΠVtag. In particular,
(2a) P→ V: Send AP1 , AP2 , . . . , APn to V .
(2b) P→ V: Send CV1 , CV2 , . . . , CVn to V .
ROUND 3: (Verifier) Send round-2 challenges of the protocol ΠPtag and round-3 responses of ΠVtag.
(3a) V→ P: Send CP1 , . . . , CPn to P .
(3b) V→ P: Send ZV1 , . . . , ZVn to P .
ROUND 4: (Prover) P verifies that the transcript {(AVi , CVi , ZVi )}i∈[n] is accepting for the subprotocol
ΠVtag. If not, abort and send nothing to V . Else,
P→ V: Send ZP1 , . . . , ZPn to V .
V accepts iff the transcript {(APi , CPi , ZPi )}i∈[n] is accepting for the subprotocol ΠPtag.
Figure 1: NON-MALLEABLE ZERO-KNOWLEDGE PROTOCOL NMtag FOR A LANGUAGE L
1. Run the adversary A with “honestly generated” verifier-messages on the right interaction, and extract
the witness for the WIPOK ΠVtag that the adversary initiates on the left interaction.
2. Use the witness thus obtained to simulate the left-interaction of the adversary A and rewind the WI
proof of knowledge ΠPtag′ it initiates on the right interaction to extract the witness for the statement x′.
Carrying out this agenda involves a number of difficulties. We first describe how to accomplish Step 1.
This is done by invoking the simulator for the Feige-Shamir protocol, and is described below. Informally, S
extracts the witness w′ that the MIM A uses in the subprotocol ΠVtag in the left-interaction. Then, S acts as
the honest prover using the witness w′ in the protocol ΠPtag.
We now describe how to carry out Step 2 of the agenda, and show that at the end of Step 2, S extracts a
witness for the statement x˜ that the MIM adversary A uses in the right-interaction with essentially the same
probability that A convinces the verifier on the right-interaction. S starts by running the protocol in the
left-interaction using the witness w′ it extracted using the strategy in Step 1. Consider the moment when A
outputs the first message on the left (that is, the first message in the subprotocol ΠVtag). Consider two cases.
First Case: At this time, A has not yet received the round-3 messages in the right interaction (that is, the
challenges in the subprotocol ΠPtag′) (See Figure 2(i)). In this case, the Round-1 message that A sends on the
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Ptag x A x˜ Vtag′
←−−−−
(1)←−−−−−−−−→ −−−−→
(3′)←−−−−←−−−−−−−−→ −−−−→
Ptag x A x˜ Vtag′
←−−−−−−−−→
(3′)←−−−−
(1)←−−−−−−−−→←−−−−−−−−→ −−−−→
Figure 2: Two scheduling strategies (i) on the left and (ii) on the right
left interaction is independent of the Round-3 message in the right interaction. Now, S proceeds as follows:
S runs the left-interaction as a normal prover Ptag would with the fake-witness w′, and rewinds the protocol
ΠPtag′ on the right-interaction to extracta witness for the statement x˜. Since the rewinding process does not
change the messages in the right-interaction before round 3, S can use w′ to produce the left-interaction just
as an honest prover with witness w′ would.
Second Case: A has already received the challenges in the subprotocol ΠPtag′ in the right interaction (See
Figure 4(ii)). In this case, trying to rewind in the WIPOK ΠPtag′ on the right is problematic, since A could
change the first message on the left, every time it is fed with a different challenge in round-3 on the right-
interaction. In this case, S proceeds as follows: Every time the extractor for the WIPOK ΠPtag′ in the
right-interaction rewinds, S repeats the entire procedure in Step 1 of the agenda to extract a witness w′
corresponding to the (potentially new) Round-1 message in the left interaction. S then simulates the left-
interaction with the witness thus extracted. The extraction procedure on the right-interaction is unaffected
by the rewinding on the left.
Correctness. First, we show that the view generated by S following Step 1 of the agenda is indistinguish-
able from the view of A in a real interaction, even to a distinguisher that has access to the oracle O(tag, ·, ·)
that inverts COMtag′ for any tag′ 6= tag (Claim 1) Then, we use this to show that the implicit witness in
the transcript of the subprotocol ΠPtag′ in the right-interaction is indistinguishable between the simulated and
the real execution (Claim 2). This means that (1) the extraction on the right succeeds with essentially the
same probability that A manages to convince the verififer Vtag′ in the right-interaction, and moreover, (2) the
witness that S extracts from the right interaction of A is computationally indistinguishable from the witness
that A uses in the real interaction. Together, these claims imply the correctness of the stand-alone prover S.
Note that the simulator is entirely classical, with no oracle access; the adaptive security of the commitment
scheme is used only in Claim 2.
Running Time. Let X1 be the random variable representing the number of times S has to rewind the
protocol ΠVtag in the left-interaction to extract a fake witness. Similarly, let X2 be the random variable
representing the number of times the extraction procedure on the subprotocol ΠPtag′ on the right interaction
has to rewind to extract a witness.
The problematic case is the second one (Figure 2(ii)) where the total expected running time is X =
X1X2, since every time the extraction procedure on the right rewinds, S has to extract a new fake witness
in the left-interaction. Thus, E[X1X2] =
∑
a∈Z+ aPr[X1 = a]E[X2|X1 = a]. However, noting that
the number of times the extractor needs to rewind on the right is independent of the number of times the
simulator rewinds on the left-interaction, we get that this is simply E[X1]E[X2], which is polynomial. 
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A Preliminaries and Standard Definitions
Concurrent Non-Malleable Commitment. Our definition of concurrent non-malleable commitment is
almost identical to that of [26]; the main difference is that we use a definition of non-malleability w.r.t tags.
Let COMtag = 〈Ctag, Rtag〉 be a family of commitment schemes. Consider man-in-the-middle adversaries
that are participating in left and right interactions in which m = poly(n) commitments take place. We
compare between a man-in-the-middle and a simulated execution. In the man-in-the-middle execution, the
adversary A is simultaneously participating in m left and right commitments. A receives commitments to
values v1, . . . , vm using identities TAG1, . . . , TAGm of its choice and attempts to commit to a sequence of
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related values v˜1, . . . , v˜m using identities ˜TAG1, . . . , ˜TAGm. If any of the right commitments generated by
the adversary are invalid, or undefined, its value is set to ⊥. For any i such that ˜TAGi = TAGj for some
j, set v˜i = ⊥. That is, any commitment where the adversary uses the same identity as one of the honest
committers is considered invalid.
Let mimA〈C,R〉(v1, . . . , vm, z) denote a random variable that describes the values v˜1, . . . , v˜m and the
view of A in the above experiment. In the simulated execution, the values v1, . . . , vm are chosen prior to the
interaction but the simulator S gets nothing. We let staS〈C,R〉(1
n, z) denote a random variable that describes
the values committed to in the output of S (which consists of a sequence of values v˜1, . . . , v˜m) together with
the view of S; as before, whenever the view contains a right interaction where the identity is the same as
any of the left interactions, v˜i is set to ⊥.
Definition 4 (Concurrent Non-Malleable Commitment [25]) A commitment scheme COM is said to be
concurrent non-malleable with respect to commitment if for every polynomial p(·), and every PPT A
that participates in at most m = p(n) commitments, there exists a PPT simulator S such that the ensembles{
mimA〈C,R〉(v1, . . . , vm, z)
}
v1,...,vm,z
and
{
staS〈C,R〉(1
n, z)
}
1n,z
are computationally indistinguishable.
Non-Malleable Zero-Knowledge. We consider a family of interactive proofs, where each member of the
family is labeled with a tag string TAG ∈ {0, 1}m, and m = m(n) is a parameter that potentially depends
on the length of the common input (security parameter) n ∈ N . We consider a MIM adversary A that is
simultaneously participating in a left and a right interaction. In the left interaction, A is verifying the validity
of a statement x by interacting with a prover PTAG while using a protocol that is labeled with a string TAG.
In the right interaction A proves the validity of a statement x˜ to the honest verifier V ˜TAG while using a
protocol that is labeled with a string ˜TAG. Let mimAV (TAG, ˜TAG, x, x˜, w, z) be a random variable describing
the the output of V in the man-in-the-middle experiment.
In the stand-alone execution only one interaction takes place. The stand-alone adversary S directly
interacts with the honest verifier V . As in the man-in-the-middle execution, V receives as input a tag ˜TAG
and an instance x˜. S receives instances x, TAG, x˜, ˜TAG and auxiliary input z. Let staSV (TAG, ˜TAG, x, x˜, z) be
a random variable describing the the output of V in the above experiment when the random tapes of S and
V are uniformly and independently chosen.
The formal definition of non-malleability is as follows.
Definition 5 (Tag-based non-malleable interactive proofs) A family of interactive proofs 〈PTAG, VTAG〉
for a language L is said to be non-malleable with respect to tags of length m if for every probabilis-
tic polynomial time man-in-the-middle adversary A, there exists a probabilistic expected polynomial time
stand-alone prover S and a negligible function ν : N → N , such that for every (x,w) ∈ L×RL(x), every
x˜∈{0, 1}|x|, every TAG, ˜TAG∈{0, 1}m so that TAG 6= ˜TAG, and every z ∈ {0, 1}∗:
Pr
[
mimAV (TAG, ˜TAG, x, x˜, w, z) = 1
]
< Pr
[
staSV (TAG, ˜TAG, x, x˜, z) = 1
]
+ ν(|x|)
Non-malleable Zero-Knowledge. Non-malleable ZK proofs are non-malleable interactive proofs that
additionally satisfy the ZK property.
B Non-Malleable Commitment Schemes
First, we present two constructions of adaptively secure bit-commitment schemes – the first construction
assumes adaptively secure injective one-way functions (subsection B.1) and the second assumes adaptively
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secure PRGs (subsection B.2). The first construction is non-interactive and the second is a 2-round com-
mitment scheme. Next, we show a simple “concatenation lemma”, that constructs an adaptively secure
string-commitment scheme from an adaptively-secure bit-commitment scheme(subsection B.3). Finally, we
show that an adaptively secure commitment scheme is also non-malleable (subsection B.4).
B.1 Construction from Adaptively Secure Injective One-Way Functions
In this subsection, we present a construction of an adaptively secure bit-commitment scheme, given a family
of adaptively secure injective one-way functions. The construction is the same as Blum commitment, with a
slight twist: instead of xor-ing the hardcore bit with the input bit, we make sure (by the choice of randomness
to the Goldreich-Levin predicate) that the hardcore bit is the same as the bit to be committed. This is to
prevent an obvious malleability attack.
Lemma 11 Assume that there exists a family of adaptively secure injective one-way functions. Then,
there exists an adaptively secure bit-commitment scheme. Furthermore, the commitment scheme is non-
interactive.
Proof: Let Fn = {ftag : {0, 1}n 7→ {0, 1}m(n) | tag ∈ {0, 1}n} be a family of injective one-way functions.
The commitment scheme COMtag is constructed as follows. To commit a bit b, COM picks a random
x ∈ {0, 1}n and a random r ∈ {0, 1}n subject to the condition that 〈r, x〉 = b. Compute y = ftag(x). The
commitment is (y, r).
Since each ftag is injective, the commitment is perfectly binding.
Assume, for contradiction, that there is an adversary A that breaks the adaptive security of COM. Then,
we construct a PPT adversary B that breaks the adaptive security ofF . B will use an intermediate adversary
B′, which on input (tag, y, r) computes the Goldreich-Levin hardcore bit 〈f−1tag(y), r〉 with non-negligible
probability, with access to the oracle O(tag, ·, ·) that on input (tag′, y′) returns f−1tag′(y′) if tag′ 6= tag and
⊥ otherwise.
B′ works as follows: On input (tag, y, s), B′ runs A with input (tag, y, s). Note that (tag, y, s) is a
commitment to a random bit. When A asks a query (tag′, y′, s′) (where tag′ 6= tag) B′ uses the inversion
oracle for the one-way function to compute x′ = f−1tag′(y
′) and returns the inner product 〈x′, s′〉 toA. Finally,
B′ outputs whatever A outputs.
It is easy to see that B′ perfectly simulates the view of the adversary A where the challenge to A is a
random commitment to the bit b = 〈f−1tag(y), s〉. B′ predicts the Goldreich-Levin hardcore bit with the same
probability that A predicts the committed bit.
The construction of B from B′ is exactly the same as the Goldreich-Levin construction of a one-way
function inverter from a hardcore-bit predictor: one only needs to observe that the Goldreich-Levin con-
struction is black-box and uses only queries to the hardcore-bit predictor on the same index tag, to invert
the function ftag. 
B.2 Construction from Adaptively Secure Pseudorandom Generators
We will construct a two-round statistically binding, adaptively secure bit-commitment scheme from adap-
tively secure pseudorandom generators (PRG). The construction is exactly the same as Naor commitment,
except that we use a family of adaptively secure PRGs.
Lemma 12 Assume that there exists a family of adaptively secure pseudorandom generators. Then, there
exists a 2-round adaptively secure bit-commitment scheme.
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Proof: Let Gn = {Gtag : {0, 1}n 7→ {0, 1}m(n) | tag ∈ {0, 1}n} be a family of adaptively secure pseudo-
random generators, where m(n) ≥ 3n. The commitment scheme COMtag is constructed as follows. To
commit to a bit b, the sender S and receiver R run the following protocol.
1. R picks a random string r ∈ {0, 1}m(n) and sends it to S.
2. S picks a random string s ∈ {0, 1}n and sends toR the value y = Gtag(s) if b = 0 and y = r⊕Gtag(s)
if b = 1.
The statistical binding of this commitment scheme follows by the same argument as that for the Naor
commitment.
Assume, for contradiction, that there is an adversary A that breaks the adaptive security of COM. Then,
we construct a PPT adversary B that breaks the adaptive security of the PRG G.
On input (tag, y), B runs A until it returns the first-round message r for a commitment. B picks a
random bit b: If b = 0, it returns (tag, y) to A. If b = 1, it returns (tag, y ⊕ r) to A. When A asks B for
a decommitment on a transcript (tag′, r′, y′) (where tag 6= tag′), B does the following: Use the adaptive
PRG-oracle to determine which of y′ or y′ ⊕ r′ is in the range of Gtag′ . If y′ is in the range, return 0, else
if y′ ⊕ r′ is in the range, return 1. If both are in the range, return a random bit and if neither is in the range,
return ⊥. Finally, A returns a bit b′. B outputs 0 if b = b′ and 1 otherwise.
It is easy to see that B simulates the answers to the decommitment queries perfectly6. If y is pseudoran-
dom, then the commitment returned by B is distributed exactly like a commitment to the bit b. On the other
hand, if y is random, then the commitment returned by B is independent of the bit b, which means that A
cannot guess the bit b with probability better than 12 . From this fact, it follows by a standard argument that
B distinguishes between the case where y is random and when it is pseudorandom, if A predicts correctly.

B.3 Concatenation Lemma
In this section, we show a “concatenation lemma”, which gives a way to construct an adaptively secure
string-commitment scheme from an adaptively-secure bit-commitment scheme.
Lemma 13 If there is an adaptively secure family of bit-commitment schemes, then there is an adaptively
secure family of string-commitment schemes.
Proof: Given an adaptively secure bit commitment scheme {COM′tag}tag∈{0,1}n , we construct an adaptively
secure string-commitment scheme {COMtag}tag∈{0,1}n as follows: To commit to a string m = m1 . . .m`,
COMtag runs many instances of COM′tag, in parallel. More precisely, COM does the following: Run
COMtag(m1), . . . ,COMtag(m`) and output the concatenation of the ` commitments.
Assume, for contradiction, that there is a PPT adversary A that breaks the adaptive security of COM.
Then, we construct a PPT adversary B that breaks the adaptive security of COM′. The proof will essentially
follow by a hybrid argument. B runs A until it produces two messages m¯0 = m10 . . .m`0 and m¯1 =
m11 . . .m
`
1. B picks a random i ∈ [`], internally simulates the commitment interactions of COM′ using the
tag tag and on input bit m0j , for j < i and for input bit m1j for j > i. For j = i, B runs a commitment
instance of COM′ on tag tag with input bit mi interacting with the outside and forwarding the messages to
and from the adversary A.
6In the case that the commitment transcript is ambiguous, namely it is a valid commitment to both 0 and 1, B returns a random
bit, which is the expected behavior (See the definition of the commitment-inversion oracle)
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To answer the commitment-inversion queries of A, note that the legal such queries contain a tag tag′ 6=
tag and thus, B can obtain their decommitments from the commitment inversion oracle for COM′. The proof
now follows by a simple hybrid argument, and is omitted here. 
B.4 Non-Interactive Concurrently Non-Malleable Commitment
In this section, we show that adaptively secure commitment schemes are also non-malleable. Furthermore,
the first of our commitment schemes (based on adaptive injective one-way functions) actually yields a non-
interactive concurrently non-malleable commitment scheme. This proves Theorems 1 and 2.
Lemma 14 Let {COMtag}tag∈{0,1}n be a tag-based adaptively secure commitment scheme Then, there is a
non-malleable commitment scheme COM′.
Proof:(Sketch.) The commitment scheme COM′ works as follows: to commit to a message m, it first
picks a pair (VK, SK) for a one-time signature scheme. Then, it runs COMVK(m) and signs the resulting
commitment using the signature key SK.
We will first show that COM′ is a one-many non-malleable commitment scheme. That is, the man-
in-the-middle adversary only gets one commitment from the left interaction (and he can produce many
commitments on the right to “related messages”). Then, we will use a proposition of Pass and Rosen [26]
that shows that any commitment scheme that is one-many non-malleable is also fully (many-many) non-
malleable.
To show the first part: for every A that receives one commitment on the left and produces many commit-
ments, we construct a simulator S that, without receiving the commitment on the left, commits to values that
are indistinguishable from what A committed to. S computes a key-pair (VK, SK) for the one-time signature
scheme and feeds A a commitment c = COMVK(0`) and outputs whatever A outputs.
Suppose there is a distinguisher D that distinguishes between the values that A and S committed to.
Then, we produce an algorithm D′ that breaks the adaptive security of the commitment scheme. D′ gets
a commitment on the index VK, either to a random value x or to 0n from the outside. It runs A with
this commitment, and obtains the sequence of commitments (c1, c2, . . . , cn) that A outputs. Each of these
commitments ci uses tagi 6= VK since otherwise, it is possible to break the security of the signature scheme.
On the other hand, whenever a commitment uses an tagi 6= VK, D′ can use the commitment-inversion oracle
on tagi to compute the message underlying ci, and use D to distinguish between the messages. 
Proposition 15 ([26]) Any commitment scheme that is one-many non-malleable is also concurrently non-
malleable.
C Four-Round Non-Malleable Zero-Knowledge
In this section, we present a 4-round non-malleable zero-knowledge argument system. The argument system
is exactly the Feige-Shamir protocol [17], compiled with an adaptively secure commitment scheme. In our
analysis we rely on the following properties of the Feige-Shamir protocol:
• The first property is that the first prover message is (perfectly) independent of the witness used by
the prover (and even the statement!). This property has previously been used to simplify analysis, but
here we inherently rely on this property to enable our analysis.
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• The second property is that given a random accepting transcript, and the openings of the commit-
ments in the first message, it is possible to “extract a witness”. In other words, any transcript implic-
itly defines a witness; additionally, given a random transcript, this witness will be valid with a high
probability (if the transcript is accepting).
In what follows, we present a sketch of the protocol and the proof and refer the reader to Appendix C
for the full text of the protocol description and the proof.
C.1 An Adaptively Secure Witness Indistinguishable Proof of Knowledge
In this section, we describe a three-round witness-hiding proof of knowledge (WIPOK) Π, which is used
as a building block in the non-malleable ZK protocol, and state or prove some facts about the WIPOK.
The protocol is a parallelization of the 3-round zero-knowledge proof ρ for the NP-complete language of
Hamiltonicity [8, 17], with the only change that the commitment scheme used in the proof is adaptively
secure.
In fact, we construct a family of protocols Πtag, indexed by tag. The protocols Πtag has an adaptive WI
property which, roughly stated, means that the transcripts of the protocol when the prover uses two different
witnesses w1 and w2 are computationally indistinguishable, even if the distinguisher has access to a magic
oracle that inverts all commitments COMtag′ , where tag′ 6= tag.
The protocol Πtag is simply a basic 3-round WI protocol Π˜tag repeated k times in parallel (where k is a
security parameter), where the prover and the verifier choose independent random bits for each instance of
Π˜tag. We now describe how Π˜tag works. The common input is a graph G on n vertices and the string tag.
The auxiliary input to the prover is a Hamiltonian cycle in G. The protocol uses an adaptively secure family
of commitment schemes {COMtag}tag∈{0,1}k . The messages in the three rounds of the protocol Π˜tag will
be denoted A,C and Z respectively. The messages in the ith copy of Π˜tag will be denoted Ai, Ci and Zi.
Thus, the transcript of the protocol Πtag consists of {(Ai, Ci, Zi)}i∈[k].
1. (Round 1) P → V : P chooses a random n-cycle Ψ. Let Ψi,j denote the (i, j)th entry in the adjacency
matrix of Ψ. Compute n2 commitments using COMtag, one for each entry of the adjacency matrix
Ψi,j . Send the commitments to the verifier V (this message is denoted A).
2. (Round 2) V → P : Sends a random bit, denoted C, to the prover P .
3. (Round 3) P → V : If C = 0, P opens all the commitments it sent in the first round. If C = 1, P
sends a random permutation pi : [n] 7→ [n] that maps the cycle Ψ to the Hamiltonian cycle in G, and
the decommitment of all the entries Ψi,j of M such that (pi(i), pi(j)) is not an edge of the graph G.
Denote the third-round message by Z.
4. (Verifier’s Local Computation) If C = 0, V checks that Z contains valid decommitments of all the
commitments in A, and that the resulting decommitments form an n-node cycle. If C = 1, V checks
that the decommitments correspond to all the non-edges of pi−1(G).
Let O(tag, ·, ·) denote an oracle that on input tag′ and a commitment, inverts the commitment if tag′ 6=
tag, and outputs ⊥ otherwise. The lemma below shows that the protocol Πtag is witness-indistinguishable
even if the distinguisher has access to the oracle O(tag, ·, ·).
Lemma 16 Let τw denote a random transcript of the protocol Πtag between the prover P and the verifier V
on common input x and where the prover has auxiliary input w and the verifier has auxiliary input z. Then,
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for every x, z and w,w′ such that RL(w) = RL(w′) = 1, and for every PPT machine D with oracle access
to O(tag, ·, ·), the following quantity is negligible in k:∣∣Pr[DO(tag,·,·)(x, z, w,w′, τw) = 1]− Pr[DO(tag,·,·)(x, z, w,w′, τw′) = 1]∣∣
Proof: We first show that the basic subprotocol Π˜tag is zero-knowledge, even if the distinguisher has access
to O(tag, ·, ·). Witness-indistinguishability follows by a straightforward hybrid argument. The simulator
for zero-knowledge is exactly the classical GMW zero-knowledge simulator for Π˜tag. The adaptive security
of COM immediately implies that the output distribution of the simulator is indistinguishable from the real
interaction even if the distinguisher has access to O(tag, ·, ·). 
Now, we define the notion of a witness implicit in the transcript of an instance of Π˜tag, and show that
the implicit witness in Π˜tag is computable given access to O(tag′, ·, ·) for any tag′ 6= tag. Consider an
accepting transcript (A,C,Z) of the protocol Π˜tag. Note that the decommitment of the n2 commitments in
A uniquely defines an n-node graph (even though not it is not computable in polynomial-time). We observe
that if (A,C,Z) is an accepting transcript, then A has to be a commitment to one of the following two
graphs: either (1) G0, an n-cycle, or (2) G1, a (permuted) subgraph of G. Moreover, an accepting transcript
where the first message is a commitment of G0 (resp. G1) and the challenge-bit C is 1 (resp. 0) uniquely
defines a a Hamiltonian cycle in G; call this the witness implicit in the transcript. When the first message is
a commitment to G0 (resp. G1) and the challenge-bit is 0 (resp. 1), the witness implicit in the transcript is
⊥. Furthermore, we can recover the implicit witness, given oracle access to O(tag′, ·, ·).
Lemma 17 Given oracle access to the commitment-inversion oracle O(tag′, ·, ·) for an tag′ 6= tag, the
witness implicit in any accepting transcript of Π˜tag can be computed in polynomial time
C.2 The Non-Malleable Zero-Knowledge Argument System
The non-malleable ZK protocol consists of two instances of the protocol Πtag running in conjunction, one of
them initiated by the verifier and the other initiated by the prover. We will denote the copy of Πtag initiated
by the verifier as ΠVtag and the one initiated by the prover as ΠPtag. We will use the notation from the previous
subsection to describe the messages in these protocols – the messages in the protocol ΠVtag (resp. ΠPtag)
appear with a superscript of V (resp. P ).
Theorem 18 Assume that COM is a non-interactive adaptively secure commitment scheme. Then, the pro-
tocol in Figure 3 is a 4-round non-malleable zero-knowledge argument system.
Proof: Completeness, soundness and zero-knowledge properties of the protocol follow directly from the
corresponding properties of the Feige-Shamir protocol. In Lemma 19, we show that the protocol non-
malleable.
In other words, for every man-in-the-middle adversary A that interacts with the prover Ptag on a state-
ment x and convinces the verifier Vtag′ (for a tag′ 6= tag) in a right-interaction on a statement x′ (possibly
the same as x), we construct a stand-alone prover that convinces the verifier on x′ with the same probability
as A, but without access to the left-interaction. The construction of the stand-alone prover (see Lemma 19)
relies on the adaptive security of the commitment scheme COMtag. It is important to note that the stand-
alone prover itself runs in classical polynomial-time, and in particular does not use any oracles. Access to
the commitment-inversion oracle is used only to show that the stand-alone prover works as expected (and in
particular, that it convinces the verifier with the same probability as does the man-in-the-middle adversary).

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Non-Malleable Zero-Knowledge Argument NMtag
COMMON INPUT: An instance x ∈ {0, 1}n, presumably in the language L.
PROVER INPUT: A witness w such that (x,w) ∈ RL.
ROUND 1: (Verifier) Pick w1 and w2 at random and compute xi = f(wi) for i ∈ {1, 2}.
Let the NP-relation RV = {((x1, x2), w′) | either f(w′) = x1 or f(w′) = x2}.
Initiate the WI protocol ΠVtag with the statement (x1, x2) ∈ LV . In particular,
V→ P : Send (x1, x2) to P . Send AV1 , AV2 , . . . , AVn to P .
ROUND 2: (Prover) Let the NP-relation RP be
{((x, x1, x2), w) | either (x,w) ∈ RL or f(w) = x1 or f(w) = x2}
Initiate a WI protocol ΠPtag with common input (x, x1, x2). Also, send the second-round messages
of the protocol ΠVtag. In particular,
(2a) P→ V: Send AP1 , AP2 , . . . , APn to V .
(2b) P→ V: Send CV1 , CV2 , . . . , CVn to V .
ROUND 3: (Verifier) Send round-2 challenges of the protocol ΠPtag and round-3 responses of ΠVtag.
(3a) V→ P: Send CP1 , . . . , CPn to P .
(3b) V→ P: Send ZV1 , . . . , ZVn to P .
ROUND 4: (Prover) P verifies that the transcript {(AVi , CVi , ZVi )}i∈[n] is accepting for the subprotocol
ΠVtag. If not, abort and send nothing to V . Else,
P→ V: Send ZP1 , . . . , ZPn to V .
V accepts iff the transcript {(APi , CPi , ZPi )}i∈[n] is accepting for the subprotocol ΠPtag.
Figure 3: NON-MALLEABLE ZERO-KNOWLEDGE PROTOCOL NMtag FOR A LANGUAGE L
Lemma 19 The protocol NMtag in Figure 3 is non-malleable.
Proof: For every man-in-the-middle adversary A, we construct a stand-alone prover S that convinces the
verifier with essentially the same probability that A does. Very roughly, the construction of the stand-alone
prover S proceeds in two steps.
1. Run the adversary A with “honestly generated” verifier-messages on the right interaction, and extract
the witness for the WIPOK ΠVtag that the adversary initiates on the left interaction.
2. Use the witness thus obtained to simulate the left-interaction of the adversary A and rewind the WI
proof of knowledge ΠPtag′ it initiates on the right interaction to extract the witness for the statement x′.
Carrying out this agenda involves a number of difficulties. We first describe how to accomplish Step 1.
This is done by invoking the simulator for the Feige-Shamir protocol, and is described below. Informally, S
extracts the witness w′ that the MIM A uses in the subprotocol ΠVtag in the left-interaction. Then, S acts as
the honest prover using the witness w′ in the protocol ΠPtag. More precisely,
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1. S runs the MIM adversary A until the end of round 3 in the left-interaction (namely, until the sub-
protocol ΠVtag finishes). In doing so, S feeds A with the messages of an honest verifier on the right-
interaction.
2. S rewinds A to the beginning of Round 2, that is immediately after A sends the Round 1 message
in the subprotocol ΠVtag. It continues running A until it produces another accepting transcript with a
different sequence of challenges for ΠVtag in round 2b.
At this point, S can extract a witness w′ for the statement A uses in ΠVtag. Note that during the
extraction process, S sends the messages in rounds 2a and 3a as an honest prover would, and this
does not require knowledge of the witness w for the statement x.
3. S now rewinds A to the beginning of Round 2, and uses w′ as the witness in the subprotocol ΠPtag
starting from Round 2, while sending the messages in the subprotocol ΠVtag as an honest prover would.
In particular, S runs the WI protocol ΠPtag with w′ as the witness.
We now describe how to carry out Step 2 of the agenda, and show that at the end of Step 2, S extracts a
witness for the statement x′ that the MIM adversary A uses in the right-interaction with essentially the same
probability that A convinces the verifier on the right-interaction.
S starts by running the protocol in the left-interaction using the witness w′ it extracted using the strategy
in Step 1 of the agenda. Consider the moment when A outputs the first message on the left (that is, the first
message in the subprotocol ΠVtag). Now, consider two cases.
(i) (ii)
Ptag x A x˜ Vtag′
←−−−−
(1)←−−−−−−−−→ −−−−→
(3′)←−−−−←−−−−−−−−→ −−−−→
Ptag x A x˜ Vtag′
←−−−−−−−−→
(3′)←−−−−
(1)←−−−−−−−−→←−−−−−−−−→ −−−−→
Figure 4: Two scheduling strategies.
1. At this time,A has not yet received the round-3 messages in the right interaction (that is, the challenges
in the subprotocol ΠPtag′). This situation is illustrated in Figure 4(i). In this case, the Round-1 message
that A sends on the left interaction is independent of the Round-3 message in the right interaction.
Now, S proceeds as follows: S runs the left-interaction as a normal prover Ptag would with the
fake-witness w′, and rewinds the protocol ΠPtag′ on the right-interaction to extract a witness for the
statement x˜. Since the rewinding process does not change the messages in the right-interaction before
round 3, S can use w′ to produce the left-interaction just as an honest prover with witness w′ would.
2. A has already received the challenges in the subprotocol ΠPtag′ in the right interaction. Such a situ-
ation is illustrated in Figure 4(ii). In this case, trying to rewind in the WIPOK ΠPtag′ on the right is
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problematic, since A could change the first message on the left, every time it is fed with a different
challenge in round-3 on the right-interaction.
In this case, S proceeds as follows: Every time the extractor for the WIPOK ΠPtag′ in the right-
interaction rewinds, S repeats the entire procedure in Step 1 of the agenda to extract a witness w′
corresponding to the (potentially new) Round-1 message in the left interaction. S then simulates the
left-interaction with the witness thus extracted.
Note that the round-2 message of A in the WIPOK ΠPtag′ on the right-interaction is fixed, and inde-
pendent of the rewindings. Thus, the extraction procedure on the right-interaction is unaffected by
the rewinding on the left. The views generated in the left-interaction in this process are identically
distributed and thus, the probability that Vtag′(x˜) accepts on any two such views is the same. Thus,
sampling sufficiently many times ensures that extraction succeeds.
Correctness. First, we show that the view generated by S following Step 1 of the agenda is indistinguish-
able from the view of A in a real interaction, even to a distinguisher that has access to the oracle O(tag, ·, ·)
that inverts COMtag′ for any tag′ 6= tag (Claim 1) Then, we use this to show that the implicit witness in
the transcript of the subprotocol ΠPtag′ in the right-interaction is indistinguishable between the simulated and
the real execution (Claim 2). This means that (1) the extraction on the right succeeds with essentially the
same probability that A manages to convince the verififer Vtag′ in the right-interaction, and moreover, (2) the
witness that S extracts from the right interaction of A is computationally indistinguishable from the witness
that A uses in the real interaction. Together, these claims imply the correctness of the stand-alone prover S.
Claim 1 The views generated by S in the left-interaction following the strategy in Step 1 of the agenda
is indistinguishable from a real left-interaction, even to a distinguisher that has access to a commitment-
inversion oracle O(tag, ·, ·).
Proof: The view generated by S is identical to the view of A in the real interaction, except that S uses the
fake witness it extracted from the subprotocol ΠVtag, instead of the a witness for the statement x ∈ L. Thus
the transcript of the left-interaction corresponds to the interaction with a prover with witness w in the real
left-interaction, whereas it corresponds to a prover with witness w′ in the simulated left-interaction. These
two ensembles are indistinguishable, even to an adversary with access to O(tag, ·, ·), by the adaptive WI
property of Πtag (Lemma 16). 
The protocol ΠPtag′ consists of n copies of a smaller subprotocol Π˜Ptag′ , running in parallel. Define the
witness-tuple implicit a transcript of ΠPtag′ to be the n-tuple (w1, . . . , wn) where wi is the witness implicit
in the ith copy of the smaller subprotocol Π˜Ptag′ . We now show that the witness-tuple is computationally
indistinguishable between the real and the simulated interactions. This means that the witness extracted
by S in the right-interaction is computationally indistinguishable from the one that the MIM A uses in the
real-interaction. By the soundness of the protocol, this has to be the witness for the statement x˜.
Claim 2 The witness-tuple implicit in the transcript of the subprotocol ΠPtag′ (in the right-interaction) of the
real and simulated executions are computationally indistinguishable.
Proof: Suppose, for contradiction, that the two witness-tuples are distinguishable. Then, we show that
the real and simulated interactions are distinguishable, given access to a commitment-inversion oracle
O(tag, ·, ·), which is impossible by Claim 1. By Lemma 17, it is easy to compute the implicit witness
given a transcript of the subprotocol Π˜Ptag′ . Thus, it is easy to compute the witness-tuple implicit in Π˜Ptag′ ,
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given oracle-access to O(tag, ·, ·). Thus, if the witness-tuples in the real and simulated executions are dis-
tinguishable, then the transcripts of the real and simulated executions themselves are distinguishable given
oracle access to O(tag, ·, ·). 
Running Time. Let X1 be the random variable representing the number of times S has to rewind the
protocol ΠVtag in the left-interaction to extract a fake witness. Similarly, let X2 be the random variable
representing the number of times the extraction procedure on the subprotocol ΠPtag′ on the right interaction
has to rewind to extract a witness.
Consider two cases. In the first case, corresponding to Figure 4(i), the rewinding on the left interaction
is done once (until a fake witness is extracted) and the rewinding on the right interaction is done once. Thus,
the total expected running time is proportional to E[X1 +X2] = E[X1] + E[X2], which is polynomial.
In the second case, corresponding to Figure 4(ii), the total expected running time is X = X1X2, since
every time the extraction procedure on the right rewinds, S has to extract a new fake witness in the left-
interaction. Thus,
E[X1X2] =
∑
a∈Z+
aPr[X1 = a]E[X2|X1 = a]
However, the number of times the extractor needs to rewind on the right is independent of the number
of times the simulator rewinds on the left-interaction and thus E[X2|X1 = a] = E[X2]. Thus, E[X1X2] =∑
a∈Z+ aPr[X1 = a]E[X2] = E[X1]E[X2], which is polynomial. 
D CCA-Secure Encryption Scheme
D.1 Security Against Chosen-Ciphertext Attacks
Definition 6 (IND-CCA2 Security) Let Π = (Gen,Enc,Dec) be an encryption scheme and let the ran-
dom variable INDb(Π, A, k) where b ∈ {0, 1}, A = (A1, A2) and k ∈ N denote the result of the following
probabilistic experiment:
INDb(Π, A, k) :
(PK, SK)← Gen(1k)
(m0,m1, s)← AO11 (PK) s.t. |m0| = |m1|
y ← EncPK(mb)
z ← AO22 (y, s)
Output z.
where O1 and O2 denote the decryption oracles, and O2 decrypts all ciphertexts except y.
(Gen,Enc,Dec) is IND-CCA2-secure if ∀ p.p.t. algorithms A = (A1, A2), the following two ensembles
are computationally indistinguishable:{
IND0(Π, A, k)
}
k∈N
c≈
{
IND1(Π, A, k)
}
k∈N
(1)
D.2 Assumptions
In this section, we exhibit a construction of an IND-CCA2-secure encryption scheme, assuming an adap-
tively secure variant of perfectly one-way hash functions (defined by Canetti [12]), and a family of trapdoor
permutations that are uninvertible even with access to an oracle that inverts the perfectly one-way hash
function. We make the assumptions more precise below.
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The construction is a modification of an encryption scheme of Bellare and Rogaway [7], which they
proved to be IND-CCA2-secure in the random oracle. We show that the construction is IND-CCA2-secure
under well-defined complexity-theoretic assumptions, and in particular, without assuming random oracles.
Our construction is essentially as efficient as the original construction of [7]. In particular, the secret and
public keys are of size n, the security parameter. The ciphertext-size is `+O(n) to encrypt a message of size
n bits. First, we state the complexity assumption, and then present the scheme that is IND-CCA2-secure
under the assumption.
We define the notion of perfectly one-way hashing, in the presence of auxiliary information and oracle
access. The auxiliary information is an uninvertible function g evaluated on the input r. Informally, we
require that h = H(r; s) be indistinguishable from random for an adversary that is given g(r) as auxiliary
input, and gets access to an oracle that inverts every h′ 6= h. Namely, the oracle, given h′ 6= h, computes r′
and s′ such that h′ = H(r′; s′). Let O(h, ·) denote such an oracle.
We note that Canetti [12] (define and) use perfectly one-way hashing with auxiliary input to prove the
IND-CPA security (semantic security) of the [7] construction.
Definition 7 (Adaptively Secure Perfectly One-way Hashing with Auxiliary Information) A function PHGen
is called a perfectly one-way hash function if for a random H ← PHGen(1k),
1. H is public-coin; namely, for any input x, H(x; r) contains the randomness r.
2. {H(x; r)}r∈{0,1}n and {H(y; r)}r∈{0,1}n are disjoint for all x, y, and
3. For every well-spread ensemble χ, for all uninvertible g and for all PPT distinguishers D, there is a
negligible function µ such that∣∣ Pr
x←χ;r←Un
[DO(H(x;r),·)(g(x),H(x; r)) = 1]− Pr
x←χ;u←Un
[DO(u,·)(g(x), u) = 1]
∣∣ ≤ µ(n)
D.3 The Construction
Theorem 20 Assume that TDPGen is a family of trapdoor permutations that are uninvertible with access
to the H-inverting oracle, and that PHGen is an adaptively secure perfectly one-way hash with auxiliary
information. Then, there exists a IND-CCA2-secure encryption scheme.
Proof: The encryption scheme is Π = (Gen,Enc,Dec) as in Figure 5.
Let us fix some notations. A ciphertext c consists of components [c0, c1, c2, s1, s2]. c implicitly defines
the quantities r = f−1(c0) and m = H(r; s1)⊕ c1.
Assume, for contradiction, that there is a PPT adversary A that wins in the IND-CCA2 game. Then,
we construct a PPT adversary B that breaks the adaptive perfectly one-way hash function PHGen. Let c∗
denote the challenge ciphertext, which defines quantities c∗0, c∗1, c∗2, s∗1, s∗2, r∗ and m∗ as above. B works as
follows.
ANSWERING THE DECRYPTION QUERIES. Let the query be c. Now, there are two cases:
1. (c2, s2) = (c∗2, s∗2): Then, the probability that c′ 6= c′∗ and H(c′∗; s2) = H(c∗; s2) is negligible over
the choice of H ∈ PHGen(1k). Thus, (r, c1, s1) = (r∗, c∗1, s∗1), except with negligible probability. If
this is the case, then c = c∗, and thus, the query of A is invalid. B returns ⊥ in this case.
2. (c2, s2) 6= (c∗2, s∗2): Then, B can use the H-inversion oracle to compute c′ such that H(c′; s2) = c2).
Let c′ = (r′, c′1, s′1). Check that (c′1, s′1) = (c1, s1) and f(r′) = c0. If both checks pass, return
H(r′; s1)⊕ c1 to A. Otherwise, return ⊥.
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Gen(1n) : Run TDPGen(1n) and get a pair (f, f−1). Run PHGen(1k) to get a perfectly one-way
hash function H . Let PK = (f,H) and SK = f−1.
Enc(PK,m) :
1. Pick random r ← {0, 1}n. Compute c0 = f(r) and c1 = m⊕H(r; s1) for random s1.
2. Let c′ = (r, s1, c1). Compute c2 = H(c′; s2) for random s2.
Output the ciphertext c = (c0, c1, c2, s1, s2).
Dec(SK, c) : Parse c as (c0, c1, c2, s1, s2).
1. Compute r′ = f−1(c0), and m′ = c1 ⊕H(r′; s1).
2. Let c′ = (r′, s1, c1). Output m′ if H(c′; s2) = c2. Otherwise output ⊥.
Figure 5: AN IND-CCA2-SECURE ENCRYPTION SCHEME.
GIVING THE CHALLENGE CIPHERTEXT TO A. Consider the following three experiments.
1. Experiment IND(1)b : The challenge ciphertext is computed as c∗ = [f(r), u⊕mb, u′, s1, s2], where
r, s1, s2, u, u
′ are randomly chosen from the appropriate domains.
2. Experiment IND(2)b : The challenge ciphertext is computed as c∗ = [f(r),H(r; s1)⊕mb, u′, s1, s2],
where r, s1, s2, u′ are randomly chosen from the appropriate domains.
3. Experiment IND(3)b : The challenge ciphertext is computed as c∗ = [f(r),H(r; s1),H(c′; s2), s1, s2],
where r, s1, s2 are randomly chosen from the appropriate domains.
The decryption queries in each of the experiments are answered as above. Note that IND(3)b is the same as
INDb. We will show that
1. IND(1)0 ≡ IND(1)1 ,
2. IND(1)b
c≈ IND(2)b , and
3. IND(2)b
c≈ IND(3)b
The claim follows, since IND0 ≡ IND(3)0
c≈ IND(1)0 ≡ IND(1)1
c≈ IND(3)1 ≡ IND1.
IND(1)0 ≡ IND(1)1 , since in both cases, the ciphertext is a random 5-tuple, independent of mb. IND(1)b
c≈
IND(2)b since otherwise, we could distinguish between (f(r),H(r; s), s) and (f(r), s′, s) where r, s, s′ are
chosen at random. This contradicts either (1) the adaptively perfect one-wayness of H with the uninvertible
auxiliary information function f , or (2) the uninvertibility of f with access to the H-inversion oracle. A
similar argument shows that IND(2)b
c≈ IND(3)b , if the composite function g(r, s) = f(r) ◦ h(r; s) ◦ s is
uninvertible, which follows from Claim 3.
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Claim 3 The function g(r, s) = f(r) ◦ h(r; s) ◦ s is uninvertible, even with oracle access to an inverting
algorithm for h on inputs of length 3n.
Proof: Suppose there is a PPT adversary A that inverts g. Then, we show a PPT adversary B that dis-
tinguishes between the tuples (f(r), h(r; s), s) and (f(r), s′, s) for randomly chosen r, s, s′. B works as
follows: B is given a tuple (a, b, c), and it simply invokes A on (a, b, c). B answers the POWHF inversion
queries of A using its own POWHF inversion oracle. Since all the queries of A are to invert h(r˜) where r˜ is
of length 3n, B never has to invoke the inversion oracle on b.
Finally, A computes a purported inverse r′ and returns r′ to B. It checks if f(r′) = a and h(r′; c) = b.
If both checks pass, return 1, else return a random bit. If the input tuple is of the form (f(r), h(r; s), s),
then A will succeed with non-negligible probability in inverting it, otherwise A cannot produce an inverse.
Thus, B will distinguish between the tuples with non-negligible probability.  
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